Eliminate the Cultural Industries Exemption from NAFTA by Larrea, Therese Anne
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 37 | Number 4 Article 7
1-1-1997
Eliminate the Cultural Industries Exemption from
NAFTA
Therese Anne Larrea
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Therese Anne Larrea, Comment, Eliminate the Cultural Industries Exemption from NAFTA, 37 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1107 (1997).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss4/7
ELIMINATE THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIES
EXEMPTION FROM NAFTA
I. INTRODUCTION
Hollywood, it is glitzy, glamorous, decadent and alluring,
and incidentally the champion of free trade. What has forced
Hollywood out from a background "chorus" role in politics and
into directing and taking a leading role in an international
trade dilemma? Simply, the cultural industries exemption in
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade ("GATT")' and
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 2
This comment will focus on the cultural industries exemption
in NAFTA.
The cultural industries exemption in NAFTA mirrors a
comparable provision in the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement ("FTA"). 3 The exemption allows Canada to
exclude cultural industries from the free trade arena.4 The
exemption flies in the face of the "national treatment" princi-
ple that NAFTA was intended to implement.5 The NAFTA
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATTI.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8 & 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 & 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. NAFTA, supra note 2, annex 2106, 32 I.L.M. at 702. See Michael Braun
& Leigh Parker, Trade In Culture: Consumable Product or Cherished Articula-
tion of a Nation's Soul?, 22 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155, 166 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Braun & Parker]. The FTA was signed in 1988 and considered a landmark
achievement, creating a free trade market between the world's two largest trad-
ing partners. Id. at 157-58. At the time of its signing, the FTA also created the
world's largest free trade area, affecting trade of about $125 billion. Canada-
United States: Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281,
[hereinafter FTA]. The FTA is sometimes called the "CFTA" (Canadian Free
Trade Agreement). See I. Fred Koenigsberg & Joan T. Pinaire, Impact of Inter-
national Copyright Developments in U.S. Practice, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND
CoPYRIGr 523, 528 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1994) [hereinafter Koenig-
sberg & Pinairel.
4. FTA, supra note 3, art. 2005, 27 I.L.M. at 396. The cultural industries
exemption was a requirement Canada insisted upon as a condition to join
NAFTA. Lisa B. Martin, An Analysis of NAFTA'S Intellectual Property Provi-
sions, 5 No. 12 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 24, 24 (1993). No such exemption exists
between the United States and Mexico. Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 3, at
530. Therefore, this comment will focus on the tension between the United
States and Canada.
5. Martin, supra note 4, at 24. See infra Part II.C.l.a.
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principle of national treatment calls for each signatory nation
to grant other signatory nations the same protection and en-
forcement that it grants its own nationals.'
Canada has defined cultural industries broadly, includ-
ing "publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines,
newspapers, film or video recordings, video or audio record-
ings and printed music." 7 According to the Canadians, the
exemption is not an attempt to exclude foreign cultural prod-
ucts from the Canadian marketplace, but to ensure the sur-
vival of Canadian culture.' However, the American film in-
dustry claims the cultural industries exemption is a wolf in
sheep's clothing; according to the Americans, the exemption
is more economic than cultural.9 The American film industry
considers the exemption to be NAFTA's "fatal flaw," one that
unfairly hinders the American film industry from doing busi-
ness in Canada. 10
Specifically, this comment will focus on the NAFTA cul-
tural industries exemption as it relates to motion pictures.
The background will highlight the advantages of free trade
and explain why the Canadian conception of culture is consis-
tent with its desire for a cultural industry exclusion.1" The
statement of the problem section will specify the tension that
the NAFTA cultural industries exemption creates.1 2 The
analysis examines problems with the cultural industries ex-
emption, discussing its dangerous value as precedent and its
effect on new NAFTA signatory nations and other bilateral
treaties. 13 The proposal section will offer solutions to the cul-
tural industries exemption, focusing on investment and co-
productions in Canada.1 4
6. Martin, supra note 4, at 24.
7. Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 3, at 528.
8. Donald S. Macdonald, The Canadian Cultural Industries Exemption
Under Canada-U.S. Trade Law, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253, 254 (1994).
9. Steve Ginsberg, Canadian Film Maker Adds Fuel to Moviedom Feud,
L.A. Bus. J., Oct. 4, 1992, at 3.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Advantages of Free Trade
1. Arguments for Free Trade
a. Utilitarian Argument
The theory behind free trade is that it "maximizes real
economic welfare"15 through "exchange between nations
based on underlying differences of comparative advantage."' 6
"Economic free trade theory and the doctrine of comparative
advantage are roughly accurate accounts of the means by
which international trade creates global wealth."' 7 In fact,
many economists believe that these global trade policies
which have been in place since the end of World War II have
been responsible for a great deal of the world's prosperity
since then.' 8
Economists favoring free trade believe that the "individ-
ual pursuit of private gain is consistent with the general wel-
fare of society"' 9 because "the hidden hand of the market en-
sures that the producer will make what consumers want and
at the lowest price, or else he will go out of business."20
The doctrine of comparative advantage suggests that
when this theory is transposed onto the international mar-
ket, "the pursuit of national interests by individual states is
consistent with the general welfare of international society -
or, in short,... the world economy will be well served if each
individual government or state observes the law of compara-
tive costs and sells on the world market what it produces
best."2 '
15. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 854 (1995)
(quoting Benjamin J. Cohen, The Political Economy of International Trade, 44
INT'L ORG. 261, 271 (1990)).
16. Id. (quoting FRANKLIN R. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
41-42 (6th ed. 1990)); Cohen, supra note 15, at 261.
17. Id. This free trade theory is an empirical assumption upon which the
legalist model for international trade is based. Id. at 853-54. For an in-depth
analysis of the legalist model in international trade, see id.
18. Id. at 854.
19. Id. (quoting Susan Strange, The Name of the Game, in SEA CHANGES:
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A WORLD TRANSFORMED 238, 255 (Nicholas X.
Rizopoulos ed., 1990)).
20. Id. at 854-55 (quoting Strange, supra note 19 at 255).
21. Shell, supra note 15, at 854-55 (quoting Strange, supra note 19, at 255).
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b. Individual Rights Argument
In addition to the above utilitarian argument that effi-
ciency will be maximized by free trade, there is the individual
rights argument that favors free trade. 22 According to the in-
dividual rights argument, individuals own the fruits of their
labor, in essence their labor product.23 As owners, individu-
als have the right to trade their labor product for the labor
product of others. 24 Any restriction on such trading violates
an individual's rights.25 This view epitomizes the classical
liberal view of government, which focuses on restricting gov-
ernment involvement to the defense of life, liberty and prop-
erty.26 "If government goes beyond these parameters, it must
necessarily take from some and give to others."27
Within the trade arena, it is parasitical and unfair when-
ever a government adopts policy favoring producers over con-
sumers because such policy benefits producers at the expense
of consumers. 28 "Consumers must pay higher prices because
producers receive something they are not entitled to - the
patronage of consumers who would otherwise choose to buy
the products of foreign producers."29
These type of trade policies which prevent individuals
from buying products of their own choice violate their rights
to property and contract.30 "If consenting adults want to
enter into a contract, no person not party to the contract has
a right to interfere."31 Government's role is to protect the
sanctity of contract, not to limit and dictate contractual terms
and particulars for its citizens.2
22. Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the U.S.
with Implications for Int'l Trade in Europe, 26 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
539, 551-52 (1993).
23. Id. at 551.
24. Id. at 551-52.
25. Id. at 552.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. McGee, supra note 22, at 552.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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2. The Current Status of Free Trade Developments in
NAFTA
a. Canada's Cultural Industries Exclusion in
NAFTA
To thwart the "unrelenting flow of Americana"3 3 across
its border, Canadians have viewed government intervention
as necessary not only to counteract the cultural invasion but
to safeguard Canada's culture.3 4 As a result, Canada was re-
lentless in its pursuit of the cultural industries exemption in
NAFTA.35 As U.S. Trade Ambassador Carla Hills stated in a
news conference, the exemption was necessary for the
Canadians as they were "mesmerized by the culture issue. "36
The cultural industries exemption in NAFTA allows
Canada to "maintain content quotas, government subsidies,
and tax incentives that are unfavorable to the U.S. entertain-
ment industry."37 State intervention in film production has
been made via the National Film Board (a publicly-owned
company) or through public subsidy, either directly through
Telefilm Canada (a public corporation) or by income tax in-
centives.38 In addition, the Directors Guild of Canada has
lobbied the Canadian government to introduce legislation to
keep more film profits in Canada instead of allowing them to
flow back to the U.S.39 The Director's Guild of Canada claims
such legislation is needed to assure the funds necessary for
more and better productions, thereby strengthening the Ca-
nadian film industry.4 °
33. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 162.
34. Id.
35. Martin, supra note 4, at 24.
36. Stephen R. Konigsberg, Note, Think Globally, Act Locally: North Ameri-
can Free Trade, Canadian Cultural Industry Exemption and the Liberalization
of the Broadcast Ownership Laws, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 300
(1994).
37. Kirsten L. Kessler, Note, Protecting Free Trade in Audiovisual En-
tertainment: A Proposal for Counteracting the European Union's Trade Barriers
to the U.S. Entertainment Industry's Exports, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 563,
592-93 (1995).
38. Macdonald, supra note 8, at 257.
39. David Crane, Keep More Film Industry Profits at Home, Directors Urge
RAE Protection Sought to Halt Flow to the U.S., TORONTO STAR, Apr. 21, 1993,
at D1.
40. Id.
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B. The Concerns of Extending Free Trade to Culture
1. The Unique Nature of Culture
Many countries believe that culture is different from
other commodities and its unique nature requires that it be
protected. 41 International treaties have recognized the sin-
gular value of culture and have elevated it to a level of impor-
tance equal to that of other major community policies. 42 For
example, the European Commission's main objective in the
Maastricht Treaty was to "preserve the history of the Euro-
pean people by supporting their cultural endeavors at home
and creating avenues for its dissemination throughout the
world."4 3
Then European Community President, Jacques Delors,
exclaimed that "[ciulture is not a piece of merchandise like
other things ... we have [a] right to exist, to perpetuate our
traditions."44 Europe and Canada claim the link between the
preservation of cultural values and national identity as the
rationale to exclude culture from free trade.45 French film di-
rector Claude Berri exclaimed, "European cultural identity
will die" if U.S. imports are not decreased. 46 Former French
Culture Minister Jack Lang proclaimed, "[tihe soul of France
cannot be sold for a few pieces of silver."47 German film direc-
tor and president of the European Film Academy, Wim
Wenders, stated that:
If we ever give up the European film industry, then all the
other European industries will suffer in the future. Peo-
ple use, drive, wear, eat and buy what they see in the
movies. We need to regard our films in the same way as
we do our literature. Books would never be included in
international trade industry deals.41
Culture in Canada is defined broadly. 49 For Canadians it
includes "knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and practices of a soci-
41. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 174.
42. Id. at 173-74.
43. Id. at 173.
44. Id. at 174. This is a sentiment to which Canadians would most likely
ascribe. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
45. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 174-75.
46. Jonas M. Grant, Comment, Jurassic Trade Dispute: The Exclusion of
the Audiovisual Sector from the GATT, 70 IND. L.J. 1333, 1347 (1995).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 157.
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ety. "50 Canadians fear that constant exposure to U.S. culture
endangers their own national identity, causing them to be-
come even more Americanized. 51 Canadians look at the com-
mon language, geographic proximity and the intertwined Ca-
nadian-U.S. economies as reasons why Canada "eats up"
United States culture so readily.52
The statistics regarding the permeation of United States
culture into Canada are staggering. "[F]oreign (mostly U.S.)
films account for over 95% of all distributor's revenue from
Canadian movie theaters."53 The major U.S. film studios
dominate the Canadian film market, accounting for 80% of
Canadian film dollars which equals $300 million to $400 mil-
lion annually. 54 In fact, the U.S. film industry has been ac-
cused of "viewing Canada as a dumping ground [for their
films].55 This significant inroad by the Americans into such
an important cultural segment of Canadian society scares the
Canadians who view culture as the embodiment of their na-
tional identity, one on the verge of extinction by becoming
Americanized.56
2. The Doctrine of Moral Rights as an Explanation for
the Canadian View of Culture
There is no better way to understand the significance of
culture than by looking at how a country treats artistic
works. In Canada, as in Europe, the person who creates the
work (author) is the "essential rightholder."57 This right is
non-economic and called the "moral right" of the artist.58
50. Id. (quoting CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON PuB. LAW AND PUB. POLICY, OS-
GOODE HALL LAW SCH. OF YORK UNIV., TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE 139 (Marc
Gold & David Leyton-Brown eds., 1988)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 160.
53. Macdonald, supra note 8, at 254.
54. Ginsberg, supra note 9, at 3.
55. Id. This is quoted from a speech given by Robert Lantos, Chief Execu-
tive Officer of Alliance Communication Corporation, at the Beverly Hills Hotel
before the Canada-California Chamber of Commerce. Id. Alliance Communica-
tion Corporation is one of Canada's largest television and movie production
companies. Id.
56. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 157.
57. Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 3, at 537.
58. Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note, Between Thought and Possession: Artists'
"Moral Rights" and Public Access to Creative Works, 81 GEo. L.J. 2291, 2303
(1993).
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Moral rights recognize the artist's creative personality. 59
Moral rights attach to the artist and exist independently of
the economic rights in his work.60 Recognition of these rights
stems from the notion that when an artist creates, "he
projects into the world part of his personality and subjects it
to the ravages of public use."6" As a result, literary and artis-
tic works create inalienable extensions of the artist's person-
ality.62 These alienability restrictions are divided into three
categories in the moral rights doctrine: the right of publica-
tion, the right of paternity, and the right of integrity.63
a. The Three Major Categories of Moral Rights in
Canada
i. The Right of Publication
The right of publication allows the artist to determine
whether he wants to present his work publicly.64 This right
protects the artist from any "lack of inspiration ... considered
to be a breach of contract."65
ii. The Right of Paternity
The right of paternity allows the artist to claim himself
originator of the work, prevents others from unjustly claim-
ing themselves originators and prevents having the artist's
name falsely associated with another's work.66 This right
also allows an artist to create under a pseudonym.6 7
59. Id.
60. Craig A. Wagner, Note, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and
the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 632 (1989).
61. Jeffrey M. Dine, Comment, Authors' Moral Rights in Non-European Na-
tions: International Agreements, Economics, Mannu Bhandari, and the Dead
Sea Scrolls, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 545, 550 (1995) (quoting Martin A. Roeder, The
Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors & Creators, 53
HARv. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940)).
62. Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1994).
63. Dine, supra note 61, at 550. There are actually four categories of moral
rights, the fourth being the right of withdrawal. Id. However, this fourth moral
right is rarely recognized outside of France and countries that derive their law
from France. Id. at 551.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of
Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 Am. J. COMP. L. 465, 468 (1968)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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iii. The Right of Integrity
The right of integrity protects the artistic work from be-
ing mutilated, modified or distorted.68 The rationale behind
this moral right is that any unauthorized change to the artis-
tic work adversely affects the integrity of the art and hence
the reputation of the artist.69
The right of integrity is exemplified in the Canadian
case, Snow v. Eaton Centre Ltd.7 ° Canadian artist, Michael
Snow, was commissioned to create a sculpture for the Eaton
Centre. 71 The sculpture depicted 60 Canadian geese in
flight.72 During the Christmas holidays, the Centre tied red
ribbons around the geese necks.73 The Ontario High Court of
Justice held that the ribbons were "prejudicial to [Snow's]
honor and reputation,"74 and that the Centre had violated
Snow's moral right of integrity.75 The Court concluded that
"ownership of art imposes responsibilities different from
those attending ownership of ordinary commodities."76
Another striking example of the right of integrity is the
French case, Huston v. La Cinq.77 The heirs of John Huston,
a film director, sued to enjoin the televised broadcast of a
colorized version of the "Asphalt Jungle."78 Although Hus-
ton's heirs did not own a copyright interest in the film, the
French court granted the injunction on the basis that
colorization would offend the director's moral right of integ-
rity.79 Obviously, part of Canada's strict protectionist stance
on its cultural products stems from its view of moral rights.
68. Id.
69. Laura L. Van Velzen, Note, Injecting a Dose of Duty into the Doctrine of
Droit Moral, 74 IowA L. REV. 629, 633-34 (1989).
70. Jonathan S. Pink, Note, Moral Rights: A Copyright Conflict Between the
United States and Canada, 1 Sw. J. TRADE AM. 171, 186 (1994) (citing Snow v.
Eaton Centre Ltd., 70 C.P.R. 2d 105 (O.H.C.J. 1982)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Snow, 70 C.P.R. 2d at 105).
75. Id. (citing Snow, 70 C.P.R. 2d at 105).
76. Pink, supra note 70, at 186 (quoting Mark L. Rudoff, The Dancer and
the Dance: An Essay on Composers, Performers, and Integrity Rights, 29 ALTA.
L. REV. 884, 889 n.22 (1991)).
77. Id. at 171-72 (citing Huston v. La Cinq, 1991 Bull. Civ. No. 89-19.522
(May 28, 1991), available in LEXIS, Prive Library, Cassci File).
78. Pink, supra note 70, at 171.
79. Id. at 172.
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c. The Moral Rights Doctrine in the United States
Unlike Canada, in the United States, the thrust behind
the copyright laws is economic,80 as opposed to cultural.,'
The focus is as much on economic exploitation of the work as
on creativity.8 2 Once an artist transfers copyright ownership
of his work, he transfers a bundle of exploitative rights, in-
cluding "the right to reproduce, adapt or create reproductions
of the original work." 3 The artist is able to assign, lease or
waive any of these exploitative rights.8 4 As a result, the art-
ist's assignee becomes the new owner of these rights.8 5
Therefore, absent express contractual provisions to the con-
trary, the new owner can alter or destroy the art without the
artist's permission. 6
In addition, the objective of copyright law in the United
States is to "encourage the widest possible production and
dissemination of literary, musical and artistic works."87 The
copyright laws seek to afford the artist a fair return on their
creative efforts. 8 As a result, this body of law is designed to
promote the production and dissemination of artists' works.8 9
Likewise, society is thought to be strengthened by the free
flow of ideas and the increased public access to different
thoughts and expressions.9 ° The emphasis on the flow of in-
formation and on public access forms the basis for the Ameri-
can push to treat cultural products as an ordinary tradable
commodity.
3. The Economics of Film Mandates the Cultural
Industries Exclusion
The competitive threat of low-cost American films plays a
significant role in a foreign country's decision to protect their
80. Id. at 176.
81. Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 3, at 537.
82. Id.
83. Pink, supra note 70, at 176.
84. Netanel, supra note 62, at 1.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Settlemyer, supra note 58, at 2302.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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own film industry.91 A large producing country like the
United States is "able to sell inexpensive and broadly appeal-
ing products to small foreign broadcasters or theaters who
cannot afford to buy only the higher-priced products of their
own countr[ies]. 92 The argument may be made that smaller
film companies can compete with the Americans by identify-
ing and specializing their films so they appeal to market
niches.9 3 This is the economic argument known as compara-
tive advantage and was discussed earlier under the advan-
tages of free trade. 94 However, if a successful niche is discov-
ered, it may only support a few small film companies. In
addition, there is no guarantee that a successfully discovered
niche will not be detected and exploited in time by the Ameri-
can film companies.
Treating the film industry as a tradable commodity
forces it to exist under a theory of economic Darwinism, a fate
that would lead to the production of films by a few low cost
producers. 95 Many countries recognize this economic di-
lemma which is inherent in the film industry and declare
that the cultural industries exemption for film in trade trea-
ties is necessary.
Free trade threatens national culture more in some areas
than it does in others. As discussed above, the film industry
is especially prone to injury from free trade. However, there
are some cultural industries that do benefit from free trade.
96
Spurred by the passage of NAFTA, a demand for ethnic Mexi-
can handicrafts has emerged. 7 Their attraction lies in their
regionally distinctive design and materials used.98
The economics of artisan-produced handicrafts are oppo-
site to those of film. While a film costs at least several million
dollars to make and several million more to market, ethnic
91. Robin L. Van Harpen, Note, Mamas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to
Be Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 165, 183 (1995).
92. Id.
93. See id. at 184.
94. See supra Part II.A.l.a-b.
95. See, e.g., Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 183.
96. See Melissa Dowling, Mexico Group Crafts U.S. Entry, CATALOG AGE,
Jan. 1, 1995, at 22, available in 1995 WL 100010664.
97. Id.
98. See Debra Beachy, Mexican-Made Wares to Get Houston Outlet, AUSTIN
AmERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 17, 1995, at J4. See also Dowling, supra note 96, at
22.
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handicrafts are relatively inexpensive to create. The free
trade doctrine of comparative advantage works in relation to
the trade of ethnic handicrafts because a country is selling to
the world market a good that is unique and that it produces
best.
4. Historical Perspective
In 1948, when countries were sitting down to the first
round of the GATT negotiations, they did not envision that
the future of television and film would evolve to that of a mul-
timillion dollar industry.99 Accordingly, they neglected to
consider in their negotiations the effect of trade in culture.'0 0
In the first confrontation over this issue, the United
States was willing to exclude culture from free trade in the
United States-Canada FTA101 that was signed in 1988.102
The American entertainment industry adamantly opposed
the exemption. 10 3 Their concern was fiscal, but their greater
fear was the precedent that a cultural industries exemption
would set for the international trading community. 104
The Canadians argued that "culture and economics are
inextricably intertwined, so changes in one will necessarily
effect changes in the other."'1° The Canadians also argued
that as the Canadian and U.S. economies became increas-
ingly interlinked, it would become even more important to
protect Canadian culture, "the remaining vestige of national
identity."10 6 Their argument stemmed from an economic no-
tion that a "closer trading relationship is inversely propor-
tional to sovereign autonomy."' Accordingly, freer trade
with the Americans would undermine Canada's economic in-
dependence and its political sovereignty.'0 " "Reduction of
political sovereignty [would] place a premium on the preser-
vation of culture, a nation's last link to a unique identity."0 9
99. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 155.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 156.
102. See id. at 157.
103. Id. at 160.
104. Id.
105. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 160.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 161.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Brenda Dalglish, Partners in Power, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 14,
1992, at 28).
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Thus, the Canadians were steadfast in their refusal to sign
the FTA if it did not contain the cultural industries
exemption. 110
After lengthy negotiations, the Americans acquiesced to
the Canadian demands.' The Americans considered the
sizable chunk of American cultural products consumed by
Canadians. 12 In addition, the Americans were eager to sign
the FTA because they wanted to use it as a building block for
a Western Hemisphere free trade zone, one that would rival
the European Community. 13 In an attempt to soothe the en-
tertainment industry, the Americans insisted on a limitation
to the cultural industries exemption by requiring a retalia-
tion provision. 4 This provision allowed the United States to
take retaliatory measures if the Canadians took action that
had a negative impact on the American cultural industries.
1 1 5
The fact that the United States government knew they
had sacrificed the entertainment industry for the common
good of free trade can be perceived from a comment made by
then Secretary of State James A. Baker III.1"6 In a midnight
telephone call to MPAA President Jack Valenti" 7 soon after
the FTA was signed, Secretary Baker said: "[tihe Canadians
will not sign unless culture ... [is] excluded from the treaty.
Therefore, I'm going to have to throw you over the side."118
110. Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 284.
111. See id. at 299. The FTA negotiations began in 1986. Id. at 283. An
agreement was finally reached and the FTA, the first bilateral free trade agree-
ment between the U.S. and Canada, went into effect on January 1, 1989. Id.;
see also Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 156.
112. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 159. In 1986, Canada imported 75%
of all its cultural products, the majority of which came from the United States.
Id.
113. See id. at 191 n.25 (explaining that the FTA was structured to be a
model for future international trade treaties, explicitly NAFTA); Konigsberg,
supra note 36, at 282 (explaining that an important function of NAFTA was to
combat increased trade threats from the European Community).
114. See Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 160.
115. Id. at 159, 177.
116. Kelly McParland, New Culture Clash Looms for Canada: American Pol-
iticians Seek to Settle Old Free Trade Scores, FIN. POST, Nov. 3, 1993, at 13.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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C. The Technicalities of NAFTA
1. NAFTA Provisions and Enforcement
a. NAFTA Provisions
The goal of NAFTA is the "elimination of trade and in-
vestment barriers among Canada, Mexico, and the United
States... [in an effort to] create a strategic economic alliance
and the largest and richest market in the world."119 It builds
on the U.S.-Canada FTA.120 Within fifteen years of imple-
mentation, NAFTA calls for all tariffs to be eliminated on
North American products traded between Canada, Mexico
and the United States.121
An over-arching concept of NAFTA is national treat-
ment. According to Article 1703, titled National Treatment,
each country must provide nationals of another country treat-
ment no less favorable than it accords its own nationals. 122
In addition, the preamble of NAFTA calls for the reduction of
trade distortions, the development of international coopera-
tion, and the promotion of trade. 23
119. Anne M. Driscoll, Key Provisions of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Bus. AM., Oct. 19, 1992, at 3.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1703, 32 I.L.M. at 671.
123. Id., preamble, 32 I.L.M. at 297. The NAFTA preamble in full, states:
The Government of the United States of America, the Government of
Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States, resolved
to:
STRENGTHEN the special bonds of friendship and cooperation
among their nations;
CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of
world trade and provide a catalyst to broader international
cooperation;
CREATE an expanded and secure market for the goods and serv-
ices produced in their territories;
REDUCE distortions to trade;
ESTABLISH clear and mutually advantageous rules governing
their trade;
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business plan-
ning and investment;
BUILD on their respective rights and obligations under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other multilateral and bilat-
eral instruments of cooperation;
ENHANCE the competitiveness of their firms in global markets;
FOSTER creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods
and services that are the subject of intellectual property rights;
CREATE new employment opportunities and improve working
conditions and living standards in their respective territories;
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In light of these objectives, Canada insisted on extending
the FTA cultural industries exemption clause to NAFTA. 124
The exemption clauses "reserves for Canada the right to take
whatever action regarding cultural materials such as motion
pictures, records and books, that it deems in its national
interest."125
b. United States Retaliation-Section 301
Canada's ability to impose the cultural industries exemp-
tion under NAFTA does carry potential repercussions. 126 As
a counter to the exemption clause the United States insisted
on retaining the right to retaliate against Canada's use of the
exemption that the United States thought was unreasona-
ble. 127 Article 2005, paragraph 2 of the FTA, to which
NAFTA ascribes, allows either country to respond with meas-
ures of equivalent commercial effect if the exemption provi-
sion is activated. 128  Under this exemption provision, the
United States may invoke a tool of their own national trading
UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner consistent with
environmental protection and conservation;
PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare;
PROMOTE sustainable development;
STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmen-
tal laws and regulations; and
PROTECT, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights ....
Id.
124. Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 286.
125. Id. (quoting NAFTA IP Provisions Called 'Model,' Industry Concerned
by Cultural Exemption, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1433 (Aug. 19, 1992)).
126. See Kessler, supra note 37, at 593.
127. Id.
128. Art. 2005, para. 2 of the FTA states that "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of this Agreement, a Party may take measures of equivalent commer-
cial effect in response to actions that would have been inconsistent with this
Agreement but for paragraph 1." FTA, supra note 3, art. 2005(2), 27 I.L.M. at
396. Annex 2106 of NAFTA states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, as between
Canada and the United States, any measure adopted or maintained
with respect to cultural industries, except as specifically provided in
Article 302 (Market Access - Tariff Elimination), and any measure of
equivalent commercial effect taken in response, shall be governed
under this Agreement exclusively in accordance with the provisions of
the Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement. The rights and obli-
gations between Canada and any other Party with respect to such
measures shall be identical to those applying between Canada and the
United States.
NAFTA, supra note 2, annex 2106, 32 I.L.M. at 702.
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laws, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,129 as amended by
the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988.130
Section 301 compels the U.S. Special Trade Representa-
tive ("USTR") to take retaliatory action against a foreign
state's trade practices deemed to violate any agreement with
the United States or to unjustifiably obstruct U.S. commerce
in goods or services. 131 An act is considered unjustifiable
under section 301 if the "act, policy, or practice is in violation
of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the
United States." 3 2 If the USTR does undertake unilateral ac-
tion against a nation under section 301, it may impose duties,
import restrictions or a number of other trade sanctions, most
which must be designed as close as possible to offset the un-
133fair or discriminatory trade practices.
2. Effects of NAFTA After Ratification
a. Section 301 as a Negotiation Leverage
Canada has yet to implement the cultural industries ex-
emption and likewise the United States has not yet had to
129. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1996).
130. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418
§ 301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-19
(1996)).
131. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a), (c). The USTR has mandatory and discretionary
authority regarding when it is required to take retaliatory action. Id. § 2411(a)-
(b). The USTR is required to take action against trade interference when it
determines that:
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are be-
ing denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country-
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise de-
nies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce
Id. § 2411(a) (emphasis added).
The USTR has discretion on whether to take action against trade interfer-
ence when it determines that "(1) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country
is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restrains United States com-
merce, and (2) action by the United States is appropriate. " Id. § 2411(b) (em-
phasis added). Unreasonable acts, policies or practices are those defined which
do "not necessarily [need be] in violation of, or inconsistent with, the interna-
tional legal rights of the United States." Id. § 2411(d)(3)(A). Thus, the discre-
tionary standard allowing the USTR to act has a much lower threshold than the
mandatory standard.
132. Id. § 2411(d)(4)(A).
133. Id. § 2411(c).
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retaliate via section 301.'11 In addition, the U.S. market-
share of Canadian film distribution revenues has not declined
since NAFTA. 135 In essence, section 301 has primarily been
used as a leverage in bilateral negotiations. 136 Its measures
are considered drastic.137 Probably because of the fear of re-
taliation under section 301, Canada has not sought to invoke
the cultural industries exemption under NAFTA. 13 1 Canada
has made a de facto acceptance of NAFTA that does not in-
clude a cultural industries exemption. This de facto accept-
ance strengthens the U.S. argument to rid NAFTA of this ex-
emption since it is not being used. The Americans contend
that just because Canada has not made use of the exemption
does not mean there is no harm. 3 9 The fact remains that
Canada can unilaterally make a choice that is inimical to the
free trade essence of NAFTA.' 6° And by doing so, Canada can
impair the American motion picture industry so that any use
of section 301 by the United States will not restore the dam-
age occasioned by Canada's actions.' 4 '
. This "de facto acceptance" argument to rid NAFTA of the
cultural industries exclusion cuts both ways. The Canadians
believe that the exemption is a needed safeguard to preserve
their own fragile film industry.14 2 They consider it an eco-
nomic "ace" that may be needed in the future to trump any
American attempts to capture the entire Canadian mar-
ket.143 It is also considered a "David and Goliath" political
victory; one that is heralded by politicians to the Canadian
public and one in which no Canadian politician wants the
type of press that will accompany a reversal.14 4
134. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 176-77.
135. Id. at 165.
136. Grant, supra note 46, at 1364.
137. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 177.
138. Meredith A. Harper, Comment, International Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights in the 1990's: Will Trade Barriers and Pirating Practices in the
Audiovisual Industry Continue?, 25 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 153, 171 (1994).
139. See infra Part IV.
140. See supra Part II.C.l.a. See also infra Part IV.C.2.a.
141. See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
142. See Macdonald, supra note 8, at 254.
143. See id.
144. See Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 299. See also Harper, supra note 138,
at 171.
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b. Section 301 and Trade Wars
Section 301 thus allows the United States to retaliate
against Canada if the United States believes that Canada
has employed unreasonable restraints on cultural trade. 145
An exemption such as section 301 which allows retaliation in-
stead of forcing negotiation may have unsavory side effects.
In one sense, retaliation can incite trade wars. 146 Trade wars
are problematic because a foreign country's government will
not want its citizens to conclude that its policies are being
dictated by the United States. 47 Thus, to avoid political
damage, the foreign government may retaliate against the
United States' section 301 response. If a trade war does not
result, ill will is a realistic likelihood and may complicate a
quick solution, or affect future negotiations. 14
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The cultural industries exemption introduces a tension
between the United States and Canada. 149 This tension has
as much to do with cultural differences as with economic real-
ities.150 The tension stems from Canada's desire to preserve
its cultural identity.151 Canadians fear that their culture is
being overwhelmed by the United States.1 5 2 The United
States insists that the cultural industries exemption is fueled
by economic concerns, not cultural concerns.' MPAA Presi-
dent Jack Valenti insists that "[t]his [debate] has nothing to
do with culture . .. [t]his is all about the hard business of
money."' 54
The moral rights doctrine serves as an indicator of each
country's concept of culture.'55 Cultural differences should
be respected, but under the umbrella of NAFTA the commit-
ment to free trade should prevail.156 With the NAFTA cul-
145. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1996).
146. Grant, supra note 46, at 1364.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra Part II.
150. See supra Part II.B-C.
151. See supra Part II.A-B.
152. See supra Part II.A.2-B.
153. See supra Part I.
154. Grant, supra note 46, at 1343 (quoting Jack Valenti (Dec. 14, 1993) (un-
published statement, on file with the MPAA, Washington, D.C.).
155. See supra Part II.B.2.
156. See infra Part IV.
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tural industries exemption, Canada has a weapon it can
wield upon one of the United States' most important indus-
tries.1" 7 Valenti states that "if Canada is free to impose any
manner of barrier or quota on U.S. cultural industries, the
motion picture industry is left effectively unprotected, and
any resulting United States retaliation will not restore the
damage occasioned by Canada's actions."15
The cultural industries exemption gives Canada an un-
fair advantage in trade.159 In addition, it sets a dangerous
precedent for other international trade agreements and may
hurt NAFTA in the long run.160 The cultural industries ex-
emption in NAFTA should be eliminated.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Free Exchange is Better
1. The Cultural Industries Exemption Encourages
Cultural Paternalism and is Inherently
Inconsistent With Other Recognized
Treaties
There are several problems with the cultural industries
exemption in NAFTA. One problem is that the exemption
fosters cultural paternalism. 161 Canadian audiences should
have the right to enjoy whatever movies they want. The ex-
emption "protects" the Canadians from a culture to which
they may want to be exposed. The exemption has the air of
elitist paternalism by defining what kind of films Canadians
can watch.162
In addition, international treaties recognize the impor-
tance of people having the freedom to choose their entertain-
ment.'6 3 The United Nation's Agreement on the Importation
of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Material (Florence
Agreement)16 4 has been signed by sixty-one countries. 165 Sig-
157. See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
158. Cristina Del Valle, Intellectual Property Provisions ofNAFTA, 4 No. 11
J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 8, 10 (1992).
159. See infra Part IV.C.2.
160. See infra Part IV.C.
161. Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 3, at 533.
162. Id.
163. See Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 187.
164. Id. at 186-87 n.118 (citing United Nations Educational Scientific, and
Cultural Organization: Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Material (1950), arts. I & II) [hereinafter UNESCO].
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natory nations agreed to eliminate custom duties and to
grant unconditional licenses for the importation of cultural
materials.'6 6 The agreement specifically states that signa-
tory nations would "continue their common efforts to promote
by every means the free circulation of educational, scientific
or cultural materials, and abolish or reduce any restrictions
to that free circulation." 167
Another international agreement committed to a free ex-
change of ideas (and, hence, the freedom to choose one's own
entertainment) is the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 168 Article
10 proclaims, "[elveryone has the right to freedom of expres-
sion. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers." 69
2. Free Trade Fosters Cultural Identity
Ideally, a free trade system, which is the essence of
NAFTA, allows consumers the freedom to choose their
purchases, including their entertainment choices. Free trade
in cultural products may be considered one of the best ways
to foster a nation's cultural identity. Many strong and rich
cultures develop naturally in situations where citizens have
the opportunity to learn from and access creative talents from
other sources. 170  Foreign and native cultures are both
equally valuable in educating and enhancing communication
between citizens.' 7' Furthermore, "consumers are competent
to reject or at least recognize imported culture that is not con-
genial to their own convictions and social ideals."' 72 Canada
165. Id. at 187 (citing UNESCO, supra note 164).
166. Id. (citing UNESCO, supra note 164).
167. Id. (citing UNESCO, supra note 164).
168. Id. at 188 & n.121 (citing European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. (10)(1), Eur. T.S.
No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230) [hereinafter Human Rights].
169. See Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 188 (citing Human Rights, supra
note 168).
170. Id. at 189-90.
171. Id. at 190.
172. Id. For example, a researcher discovered that U.S. newspaper colum-
nists who were frequently printed in Canada were "recognized as Americans
expressing an American viewpoint [and that] their material is judged for what
it is." Id. at 190 n.127 (B.K. SANDWELL, Present Day Influences on Canadian
Society, in ROYAL COMM'N STUDIES: A SELECTION OF ESSAYS PREPARED FOR THE
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should look at the U.S. as a source that will enhance its own
cultural identity, leaving to its own citizens the expertise of
filtering and meshing the cultures into a stronger Canadian
culture.
B. The NAFTA Cultural Industries Exemption Does Not
Effectively Promote Cultural Identity
Another problem with the cultural industries exemption
in NAFTA is that force-feeding culture to people often pro-
duces undesirable results. Trade barriers imposed on en-
tertainment are not always effective in encouraging and safe-
guarding a country's cultural identity.173 These types of
barriers are usually only successful in regulating the nation-
ality of the production, not the content of the product. 174 As
an example, Canada's campaign to encourage more domestic
film making has met with mixed success. 7 ' The result has
been an increase in use of Canada for location shoots by
American film makers. 176  However, according to Robert
Lantos, chief executive officer of Alliance Communication
Corporation:17
7
Shooting in Toronto or Vancouver, disguised as New York
or San Francisco in order to save on currency, is not our
idea of reciprocity. It's good for our hotels and car rental
companies and technicians and, as long as it saves the
studios money, it will continue. But location shooting has
nothing to do with Canada creatively and it certainly is
not a way of balancing the scales. 178
ROYAL COMM'N ON NAT'L DEV. IN THE ARTS, LETTERS AND SCIENCEs 6-11 (Ed-
mond Cloutier ed., 1951)).
173. Id. at 186, 190. In fact, in 1973 the Canadian Commission for the
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization studied the
encroaching effect of new technologies on the aboriginal Eskimo. Id. at 187
n.114. The Canadians "concluded that apart from total isolation, 'we have no
means of preventing any culture from being influenced by another. Each living
culture is dynamic and in a process of constant evolution. Freezing it at a par-
ticular point is neither possible nor desirable.'" Id. (citing OLGA JURGENS, Com-
munications: Individual Rights/State Rights, in RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE 36-37
(L.S. Harms et al. eds., 1977)).
174. Id. at 186.
175. See Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 187.
176. Ginsberg, supra note 9, at 8.
177. Id. Alliance Communication Corporation is one of Canada's largest film
and television producers. Id.
178. Id.
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Thus, although this practice has technically increased the
number of domestic Canadian films, they contribute little to
national culture identity. 179
According to Donald Macdonald, former Canadian High
Commissioner to Great Britain and Northern Ireland,' the
cultural industries exemption has "not imposed a substantial
barrier to the entry and sale in Canada of American cultural
products."1"" The U.S. share of Canadian movie revenues in
1988 (the year before the cultural industries exemption in the
FTA went into effect"8 2 ) was 93%.183 At the end of 1991, the
U.S. marketshare had not withered but remained constant at
93%. 184
1. New Technologies Will Undermine the NAFTA
Cultural Industries Exemption
The cultural industries exemption ignores today's global
village reality. "[TIechnology increasingly allows market pro-
tection to be circumvented and makes the gains from such
protection short-lived."' 85 For example, American movies
shown on American television can directly be broadcast to
Canada through direct TV satellites.'8 6 Direct TV satellites
enable individual Canadian homes to set up small satellite
dishes and receive cable TV channels directly from American
cable companies, bypassing any Canadian regulations.8 7
Hubert Astier, advisor to French Culture Minister, Jacques
Toubon, admits that "in the new universe of digital broad-
179. Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 187.
180. Macdonald, supra note 8, at 253 n.a.
181. Id. at 253.
182. The FTA went into effect on January 1, 1989. FTA, supra note 3, art.
2105, 27 I.L.M. at 299.
183. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 165.
184. Id. But cf. Ginsberg, supra note 9, at 4 (estimating America's share of
the Canadian film market to be 80% or around $300 million to $400 million
annually).
185. Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 180.
186. Id. at 181.
187. Id. The Canadian government allows Canadian cable companies to sub-
stitute Canadian advertising on American programs. Id. at 182 n.87 (citing Ian
Morrison, A Plea to Perrin Beatty: Don't Ignore Needs of Viewers and CBC at
Meeting on Television Industry, GAZETTE (MONTREAL), Dec. 9, 1991, at B3).
However, with direct-to-home TV satellites, Canada loses its ability to control
American TV content and hence its influence on Canadians. See id. (citing Mor-
rison, supra).
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casting, our quotas won't protect us. They may give us a
breathing space but that's all.""'8
Although this new technology may undermine Canada's
determination to regulate its citizens cultural intake, at the
same time it creates an expanding market for Canadian-bred
entertainment.18 9 Technology such as satellites and cable
reduces the cost of distribution of the product which increases
the potential market for the product.' 90 Satellites have been
instrumental in giving remote and foreign nations exposure
to a variety of new cultures.' 9 ' As a result, the improved dis-
tribution methods and the increased demand for cultural
products has kindled the appeal for a diverse assortment of
products. 192
2. The NAFTA Cultural Industries Exemption May
Have Negative Long-Term Effects for Canada
Canada should take heed of the increased appetite for
cultural products in the international marketplace. Although
cultural preservation may seem attractive in the short run, it
may have negative long-term effects on the Canadian en-
tertainment industry. 93 For example, Canada created the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation ("CBC") and used it as a
means to "foster uniquely Canadian values through produc-
tion subsidies and programming restrictions." 94 Instead, a
cultural catastrophe ensued because Canadians increased
their television viewing time and are now clamoring for even
more American television programs, threatening the continu-
ation of Canadian television programs.
195
188. Id. at 182 (citing Michael Williams & Adam Dewtrey, GATT Spat Wake-
up on Yank Market Muscle, VARIETY EUR., Dec. 27, 1993, at 45, 49).
189. Id. at 182.
190. Id. at 182-83.
191. Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 182. Previously remote countries that
are now benefiting from satellite technology are: Brazil, India, Pakistan, and
Indonesia. Id. at 183 n.93 (citing JEAN D'ARcY, Direct Broadcast Satellites and
the Right to Communicate, in RIGr TO COMMUNICATE 1, 5 (L.S. Harms et al.
eds., 1977). Satellites have been instrumental in providing a "window to the
world" for countries which are large land masses, geographically divided, or
widely scattered. See id.
192. Id. at 182-83.
193. Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 3, at 529.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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Canada could wind up with a similar catastrophe in its
movie industry. If Canadian film makers continue making
films designed to foster Canada's cultural identity, the inter-
national appeal for such films may be slight. As a result, Ca-
nadian films will likely lose their international market share,
receiving little play outside of Canada. Losing the lucrative
international cinema audience means less money for Can-
ada's film industry. As Jack Valenti wrote in the Los Angeles
Times: "[tioday, around 40% of all the U.S. film industry's
revenue comes from international markets, and that share is
heading higher .... As the U.S. film industry has proved,
countries beyond our borders mark the map of the future.
That's where millions of new customers are."196
Canada would better service its film industry by encour-
aging film makers to create films that can compete in the in-
ternational marketplace. At the same time, the Canadian
government should allow the removal of the cultural indus-
tries exemption and permit its citizens to choose their
entertainment.
C. Even if Stricter Enforcement Might Make the Cultural
Industries Exemption More Effective, it Will Not be
Worth the Effort
1. The NAFTA Cultural Industries Exemption is a
Dangerous Precedent
The U.S. is apprehensive that the cultural industries ex-
emption may establish a dangerous precedent for future in-
ternational trade agreements. 197 The film industry sees the
exemption as "ominous and threatening.' 198 The MPAA fear
is that during future trade negotiations, other countries will
likewise demand a cultural industries exemption and that
the financial effect could be devastating. 199
196. Jack Valenti, Parting Shots on NAFTA Hollywood Cut, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at B7.
197. Del Velle, supra note 158, at 9.
198. Rod McQueen, U.S. Ranting Against Canada's Cultural Rights, FIN.
POST, Sept. 18, 1992, at 4.
199. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 160.
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a. The United States Erred by Not Protesting the
Cultural Industries Exemption Between
Mexico and Canada
The United States was naive, or extremely short-sighted,
when it did not protest Mexico's acquiescence to Canadian de-
mands for the exemption during the NAFTA negotiations.2 °°
As noted earlier, considering that the exemption was
designed to downplay the effects of American dominance in
the Canadian entertainment market, a cultural industries
exemption between Canada and Mexico did not make
sense.20 1 Instead, the lack of U.S. protest was perceived as
an implicit assent to the exemption in future negotiations.20 2
The exemption also undermines the NAFTA national treat-
ment concept, which is to provide foreign nationals treatment
no different than that provided its own nationals.20 3
b. Precedent for GATT
Both MPAA President Valenti and Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA") President Jason Berman's
20 4
fears that the NAFTA exemption would set a precedent for
GATT negotiations 20 5 were not unfounded. 20 6 During GATT
negotiations, Canada's cultural exemption in NAFTA was ad-
judged by the Europeans as precedent, requiring the United
States to grant them the exemption as well.20 7 French Presi-
dent Frangois Mitterrand stated that they had "the right to
ask the American government to have the same regard for
Europeans as they do for ... the Canadians."208
200. Id. at 167.
201. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
202. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 167.
203. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1703, 32 I.L.M. at 671. See also supra Part
II.C.1 (viewing cultural industries exemption as undermining NAFTA national
treatment policy).
204. McQueen, supra note 198, at 4. According to Berman, "[tlhe Canadians
have deliberately confused commerce and culture .... For the Canadians, cul-
ture is used to mask a real commercial interest." Id.
205. Id.
206. Kessler, supra note 37, at 593.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing Jamie Protman, Will Ottawa Protect Culture?, CALGARY HER-
ALD, Dec. 28, 1993, at B7).
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(1) France
In fact, just six days after the Uruguay Round ended in
the GATT negotiations, and without the cultural industries
exemption yet extended to GATT, European nations took ad-
vantage of the perceived precedent. 2°9 The French Senate
passed a regulation requiring radio stations to dedicate 40%
of air-time to French music. 210 The Senate defined "French
songs" as those written or interpreted by French or
Francophone artists.2 11
(2) Spain
The same day, Spain's Parliament approved legislation
requiring at least one-fourth of all movies shown in theaters
to be European.2 12 The decree was very explicit, stating that
for cities of 125,000 or more, theaters must show a European
film one day for every two days that they show a non-Euro-
pean film.213 In addition, in smaller towns, a theater must
show one day of European film for every three days it shows
non-European film. 214 The law also stated that before a dis-
tributor could receive a dubbing license for a non-European
film, they need to show earnings of at least $143,000 from
screening a Spanish or European-produced film. 215
(3) U.S. Response
These types of legislation did not escape criticism from
the United States.21 6 U.S. Trade Representative, Carla Hills,
stated:
We do not understand why the Spanish culture is more
protected by a film produced in Germany by 'Europeans'
than by a Spanish film of Mexican origin, or why the Eng-
lish culture is promoted more by a film produced in
209. See Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 178.
210. Id.
211. Kessler, supra note 37, at 596.
212. Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 178.
213. Kessler, supra note 37, at 596.
214. Id.
215. Id. Since in Spain the average revenue from a European film is
$64,000, this law essentially requires a film distributor to distribute three Eu-
ropean films before obtaining the dubbing license to distribute an American
film. Id.
216. Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 306.
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France by 'Europeans' than by a film of New Zealand
* 217origin.
MPAA President Valenti wondered whether "[tihe cul-
ture of any European [is] so flimsily anchored, so tenuously
rooted, that European consumers and Viewers must be caged
and blinded else their links with their historic and distin-
guished past suddenly vanish?"
218
2. The NAFTA Cultural Industries Exemption is
Unfair and Prejudicial
a. Violating the "Free Trade Spirit" of NAFTA
U.S. citizens have historically viewed culturally restric-
tive policies as contradictory to free trade and the free flow of
ideas and communication.219 While Canadians believe these
policies are "either defensive or constructive in character
rather than externally aggressive," 220 Americans see them as
no more than policies of blatant protectionism. 221 As Pierre
Juneau, president of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
("CBC"), stated, "[m]uch of what Canadians and most other
nations consider as culture, as essential to our sovereignty
and therefore requiring attention and support by govern-
ments, the United States leaves to a large extent in the hands
of private enterprise. "222
In support of their position that the cultural industries
exemption is protectionism, the U.S. government can point to
NAFTA's preamble. NAFTA's preamble states, in part, that
its goal is to "contribute to the harmonious development and
expansion of world trade ... reduce distortions to trade...
foster creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods
and services that are the subject of intellectual property
rights."223 The American government has good reason to con-
217. Id. (citing Nancy Dunne, EC TV Rule to be Taken to GATT, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 1989, at 8).
218. Id. (citing Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV Compromise - US
Officials Fear Protectionism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al).
219. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 164.
220. Id.
221. Id. See also Ginsberg, supra note 9, at 3 (citing that the president of the
American Film Marketing Association, Jonas Rosenfeld, claims that the cul-
tural industries exemption is more economic than cultural).
222. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 161 (quoting TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL,
June 22, 1986, at 5).
223. NAFTA, supra note 2, preamble, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
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sider the cultural industries exemption to be antithetical on
each of the above enumerated points contained within the
NAFTA preamble. It has every reason to consider the exemp-
tion clause as a barrier to free trade and one that violates the
spirit of NAFTA.
b. The Entertainment Industry is Economically
Important to the United States
The entertainment industry, including film and televi-
sion, is the United States' second largest export, surpassed
only by commercial aircraft.224 The international appetite for
American films helped the U.S. movie industry survive the
recession of the early 1990s when domestic film consumption
was low.22 In fact, with an annual trade surplus of eight bil-
lion dollars, and when compared to other industries in an era
of U.S. trade deficits, the movie industry is considered a
"trade prize."226
The entertainment industry also contributes signifi-
cantly to the American job market. In 1993, 414,700 U.S.
workers were employed in the film, television and home video
sectors.227 This was a 6.3% increase over the previous
year.22' Adding to these impressive figures is that for every
two jobs created in the film industry, three jobs are created in
other supporting industries, such as lumber, construction,
costume and catering.229
Due to the economic importance of the entertainment in-
dustry, U.S. Special Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, or
"Mr. L.A. Law,"230 as he is known in Canada, was persistent
in his efforts to renegotiate the NAFTA cultural industries
exemption. 23 1 The United States has repeatedly requested
renegotiation of NAFTA to eliminate the cultural industries
exemption.232 MPAA President, Jack Valenti, has been vocal
in his objections to the exemption.233 Valenti contends that
224. Van Harpen, supra note 91, at 178.
225. Id.
226. Grant, supra note 46, at 1335.
227. Kessler, supra note 37, at 564.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Macdonald, supra note 8, at 257.
231. See id.
232. Harper, supra note 138, at 171.
233. Id.
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the cultural industries exemption allows Canada to impose
quotas and tariffs on motion pictures which leaves the indus-
try vulnerable and susceptible to endangerment. 23 4 As Va-
lenti himself wrote in the Los Angeles Times, "[wie have to
export or we will shrink.... [Ciountries beyond our borders
mark the map of the future. That's where millions of new
customers are."235
Another outspoken opponent of the exemption is Jason
Berman, president of the RIAA.236 Berman claims that "[tihe
Canadians have deliberately confused commerce and culture
.... For the Canadians, culture is used to mask a real com-
mercial interest."23 7
c. No Cultural Industries Exemption Exists
Between the United States and Mexico
Trade between the United States and Mexico is free of
the cultural industries exemption. 238  This benefits both
countries. The United States has access to a large consumer
population hungry for American entertainment products and
Mexico has access to the large American Hispanic commu-
nity, often ignored by mainstream American companies.239
Since there is no cultural industries exemption, the goal of
NAFTA is accomplished as both countries benefit from trade
240expansion.
d. The Cultural Industries Exemption Between
Mexico and Canada has no Rational
Foundation
The exemption clause does exist between Canada and
Mexico. 241 The rationale for the exemption between these
two countries is not clear. Canadian and Mexican cultures
are vastly different and the language differences and geo-
234. See id.
235. Valenti, supra note 196, at B7.
236. See supra text accompanying note 204.
237. Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 305 (quoting Letter from Jack Valenti,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America,
to the House Ways and Means Committee's Subcommittee on Trade 3 (Sept. 17,
1992.)). See also McQueen, supra note 198, at 4 (discussing Canadian confusion
of commerce and culture).
238. Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 3, at 530.
239. Id. at 530-31.
240. Id. at 531.
241. Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 166.
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graphic distance provide "effective barriers to significant inte-
gration."242 Considering that the rationale for the exemption
was cultural imperialism, it is rather startling that the U.S.
did not protest the exemption between Canada and Mex-
ico.243 The United States' assent to an exemption between
Canada and Mexico was additionally perceived as an implicit
endorsement of a cultural industries exemption by the Euro-
pean Community when negotiations began for GATT.244
e. Explicit Recognition of the Moral Rights
Doctrine in the United States Would
Enfeeble the American Entertainment
Industry
Proponents of the U.S. approach to copyright law opine
that an outright recognition of artists' moral rights would
destabilize the lucrative American entertainment indus-
try.245  The argument is that if artists retain inalienable
moral rights in their art, the market for their works will suf-
fer.246 It will suffer because buyers will not want to purchase
or will pay much less for artistic works that allow artists to
retain a substantial level of control.247 This line of reasoning
continues in that the reduction in the artists' remuneration
will result in less incentives for the artist to create, thereby
reducing the availability of creative works.24 s
As Professor Robert Gorman, a critic of adopting moral
rights in the United States, states:
The principal entertainment and cultural industries of
the United States .. .are highly collaborative .... The
introduction into these industries of a right - exercisable
by any one ... contributor[ I - to protest the alleged dis-
242. Id.
243. See id. at 166-67. One possible explanation for the exemption between
Canada and Mexico is that Canadian cultural industries "are so saturated by
foreign interests that any subsequent foreign ownership, no matter by whom or
how minimal, would be devastating." Id. at 167. As Robert Lantos, one of Can-
ada's largest film and TV producers stated, "[the clultural exemption is not di-
rected against the U.S. any more than it is directed against Ireland or Spain or
Australia, [iut's directed toward Canada." Id. at 167 n.77. See also Ginsberg,
supra note 9, at 3.
244. See Braun & Parker, supra note 3, at 167; See infra Part IV.A.5.
245. Settlemyer, supra note 58, at 2308-09.
246. Id. at 2309.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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tortion or modification of a particular ... artistic contribu-
tion is extremely problematic. At best, it introduces an
element of instability and uncertainty, as well as the fre-
quent possibility, because of the increased threat of litiga-
tion, of delay in public access to and enjoyment of en-
tertainment vehicles. At worst, it threatens to prevent
altogether the dissemination to the United States and in-
ternational public of a host of cultural and entertainment
materials in forms that are varied, appealing and afforda-
ble. Any significant limit upon the ability of producers
and publishers to disseminate works... runs a significant
risk of chilling investment in the arts and entertainment
field. This may in turn reduce the financial support of an
innovative creative endeavor - a result that will obvi-
ously be harmful to the public interest. Introduction of
moral rights into these industries . . .will also unsettle
the network of contractual agreement that have been de-
veloped over many years in the various industries and
that appear on the whole to be working quite successfully
and fairly.
24 9
As many critics contend, the theory behind moral rights
advocates a type of "cultural conservatism."25" Expression is
inhibited due to an "unnecessary deference to the creator's
original intentions."251 This type of control is typical of pri-
vate censorship 2 52 and conflicts directly with the purposes
and functioning of the American copyright laws.2 5 3
249. Id. at 2310-11.
250. Id. at 2310.
251. Settlemyer, supra note 58, at 2310. Artists should not "be regarded as
almighty creatures who pour particular meanings into their creations and
thereafter inherently have undisputed authority over the uses and interpreta-
tions of these creations." Id. at 2310 n.84 (citing Lawrence A. Beyer, Intention-
alism, Art, and the Suppression of Innovation: Film Colorization and the Phi-
losophy of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1011, 1027 (1988)).
252. See id. at 2310. Recognition of artists' moral rights could permit them
to prohibit "improper interpretive borrowing and adaptation of their creations,"
which ultimately could discourage dissemination of creative works to the pub-
lic. Id. at 2309 (quoting Beyer, supra note 251).
253. Id. "American copyright law is 'not primarily designed to provide a spe-
cial private benefit' to creative artists, but to encourage the dissemination of
these works to the public." Id. at 2308 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
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f. Other Areas of American Law Offer Some
Protection of Moral Rights
Critics of any proposal for the U.S. adoption of moral
rights also point to the fact that artists' moral rights receive
some protection in other areas of U.S. law.254 Contracts that
do not contain specific provisions prohibiting modification
(right of integrity) of the artwork have only been construed in
favor of the artist when the court considers the alteration to
extend beyond the specific property right purchased. 255 But
where a contract is ambiguous, courts have occasionally
found in the artist's favor, thus crediting artists for their
work (right of paternity)256 and recognizing implied contrac-
tual rights.257
254. Id. at 2311.
255. Van Velzen, supra note 69, at 641. See id. at 640 n.93 (citing McGuire
v. United Artists Television Prods., 254 F. Supp. 270, 271-72 (S.D. Cal. 1966)
(permitting television company to edit writer's script to insert television com-
mercials because contract did not prohibit); Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (determining producer not
compelled to grant writer screen credit because writer did not reserve that con-
tractual right), rev'd on other grounds, 139 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1943); Stevens v.
National Broad. Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755, 758 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966) (en-
joining edits by television broadcaster that would materially distort plaintiffs
movie but permitting insertion of undistorting commercials); Preminger v. Co-
lumbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, 603 (1966) (declaring that contract
rights giving producer final movie editing rights did not extend to television
without specific contractual provision), affd per curiam, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, affd
mem., 18 N.Y.2d 659 (1966)).
256. Van Velzen, supra note 69, at 641. See id. n.101 (citing Phillip v. Je-
rome H. Remick & Co., 145 F. Supp. 756, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (determining that
doubt in contract should be determined in composer's favor); Curwood v. Affili-
ated Distribs., Inc., 283 F. 219, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (prohibiting movie pro-
ducer from using famous author's name on any film other than movie for which
author sold story rights); Stevens v. National Broad. Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
755, 758 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966) (enjoining broadcasting company from inserting
commercials into film when contract did not give company the right to make
changes for television broadcast); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 14, 18 (1962) (determining that contract prohib-
iting "material changes" in story being made into movie applied to changing
sequence, locus, development of plot, theme, thought, or main action); Seroff v.
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 162 N.Y.S.2d 770, 777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (dictum)
(determining that publisher had duty to hire good foreign translator when
writer sold publisher translation rights)).
257. Van Velzen, supra note 69, at 641. See id. at 641-42 n.102 (citing Ettore
v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 487-88 (3d Cir. 1956) (deter-
mining that since television was not invented at time of original contract,
prizefighter did not waive all rights or television appearance); Poe v. Michael
Todd Co., 151 F. Supp 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (denying writer's claim to
screen credit for movie because evidence insufficient to warrant relief, but not-
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An example of an artist's moral rights protected by judi-
cial intervention can be found in Gilliam v. American Broad-
casting Companies.2 58 In Gilliam, ABC edited three "Monty
Python" episodes.2 59 The Second Circuit held that the degree
of editing by ABC was improper, especially considering that
there was a contractual provision limiting ABC's right to edit
the "Monty Python" shows.2 60 The court also inferred that
even in the absence of contractual provisions, extensive un-
authorized editing constituted copyright infringement.26 1
The court concluded that Gilliam's cause of action for defor-
mation of an artist's work stemmed from the concept of moral
rights.262
Artists in the U.S. have also been able to rely on tort law
to protect their creative rights. In Big Seven Music v. Len-
non, 2 63 the court referenced a privacy statute to enjoin the
record company from selling an album whose cover and audio
recording were of inferior quality.264
The U.S. adoption of the Berne Convention for the Pro-
tection of Literary and Artistic Works on October 31, 1988265
is also evidence of the U.S. de facto recognition of the moral
rights doctrine.26 6 Member nations of the Berne Convention
are required to offer moral rights protection under their local
laws.267 When the United States joined the Berne Conven-
tion, Congress declared that the moral rights of attribution,
disclosure and integrity were protected under various ex-
isting laws.268
Thus, for an American artist to have a stronger chance of
having his moral rights recognized in court, it is important
ing importance of implying credit in entertainment contract); Clemens v. Press
Publ'g Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207-08 (N.Y. App. Term. 1910) (determining that
newspaper breached implied credit contract with writer when it refused to pub-
lish story with writer's name or to pay him)).
258. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
259. Id. at 17.
260. Id. at 22.
261. Id. at 23-24.
262. Id. at 24.
263. 554 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1977).
264. Id. at 504, 512.
265. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853.
266. Pink, supra note 70, at 179.
267. Id. at 179-80.
268. Id. at 180. However, "it is doubtful that [the U.S.] Congress intended to
indicate a willingness to embrace a Canadian-style moral rights doctrine." Id.
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that he add provisions to his contract of sale, lease, etc. that
attempt to protect his moral rights. This will increase his
chance that the court will expand existing legal doctrines to
safeguard his moral rights.
3. The NAFTA Cultural Industries Exemption may
Complicate Adding Future Signatories
a. Enthusiasm for NAFTA has Cooled
The exemption in NAFTA is one only Canada can in-
voke.2 69 The exemption applies only to Canada and cannot be
claimed by future signatory nations.27 0 However, it is becom-
ing more and more uncertain whether Latin American coun-
tries wish to join NAFTA2 7 1 or use it as a model for future
multilateral trade agreements.272 As Washington's excite-
ment for NAFTA has cooled,27 3 so has Latin America's verve
to join.274 Brazil, Latin America's largest economy, had been
eager to join existing Latin American trade treaties in an at-
tempt to use them as building blocks to merge into
NAFTA.275 Yet it now appears that Brazil could have been
motivated by "desire to keep the [United States] as much as
possible out of South American affairs."276 As NAFTA has
become less popular in the United States, Brazil's interest
has likewise dwindled.277
269. Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 3, at 530.
270. Id.
271. See Stephen Fidler, Faded Spirit of Miami: Enthusiasm for Free Trade
Accords in the Americas Has Waned, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1995, at 18 [hereinaf-
ter Fidler]. See also Special Report: Trade Outlook for 1995: Latin America,
INT'L TRADE REP., Jan 18, 1995, at 134, available in 1995 WL 11165354 [herein-
after Special Report].
272. Special Report, supra note 271, at 134.
273. Fidler, supra note 271, at 18. See also Peter Hakim, NAFTA Expansion
is Slowed, But Not Stopped, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 30, 1995, at 19
[hereinafter Hakim]. Washington's loss of enthusiasm for NAFTA coincided
with an economic crisis in Mexico which began just two weeks after the summit
and would continue for a year. Id. This was an unexpected reversal and the
U.S. thereafter viewed Mexico and the rest of Latin America as potential polit-
ical liabilities. Id.
274. Fidler, supra note 271, at 18; see also Hakim, supra note 273, at 19.
275. Fidler, supra note 271, at 18. Brazil had considered MERCOSUR,
which establishes the Southern Common Market joining the nations of Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, as a trade agreement that would eventu-
ally be incorporated into NAFTA. Id. See also Special Report, supra note 271,
at 134.
276. Fidler, supra note 271, at 18.
277. Id.
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Latin American countries are also giving hints that
NAFTA may not be the "end-all" of trade treaties. 8 The Or-
ganization of American States Secretary-General, Cesar
Gaviria, cautioned that "in moving to hemispheric free trade,
the countries should not rely on the solution of any one coun-
try."279 Gaviria stated that "what must be avoided at all
costs, is making the mistake of using any of the existing
agreements as the mandatory basis for establishing economic
integration."28 0
b. Adding Nations may be Necessary for
Preservation of NAFTA
If NAFTA does loose its momentum and other trade
agreements are negotiated, the cultural industries exemption
precedent may become a problem. As reported in the Decem-
ber 11, 1995 Financial Times, currently there are more than
two dozen free trade accords that have sprung to existence in
the last four years, eight more are under negotiation.281
NAFTA only allows Canada to use the exemption, and if ex-
panding NAFTA is not deemed attractive to either the U.S. or
other Latin American countries, the cultural industries ex-
emption may become an obstacle to other negotiations. Thus,
it behooves the United States to extend NAFTA to other
Latin American countries rather than restarting negotiations
which may raise the precedent of the cultural industries ex-
emption, much as it was raised by the Europeans during
GATT.282 Mark Anderson, Director of the Task Force on
Trade, testified at a Congressional hearing that the NAFTA
cultural industries exemption "has been particularly harmful
to the U.S. entertainment industry .... [I]t has been cited by
... the European Union, and other countries as the basis for
exempting their cultural industries from WTO [World Trade
Organization] discipline. It must not be extended to other
nations."2 83
278. Special Report, supra note 271, at 134.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Fidler, supra note 271, at 18.
282. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.
283. Fast Track Trade Powers, 1995: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Trade Committee on Ways and Means on Fast Track Negotiating Authority,
104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Mark A. Anderson, Director, Task Force on
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c. Chile-An Opportunity to Keep NAFTA Vital
In this light, the United States may want to rethink its
denial of the "fast track process" for Chilean integration into
NAFTA.2 4 The Chilean government has enacted extensive
free-market reforms that have resulted in the region's most
liberalized business climate. 2 5 Enrolling Chile into NAFTA
would underscore Washington's desire to transform its Latin
American policy from aid to trade.2 6 The addition of Chile
into NAFTA would also send a signal to other Latin Ameri-
can countries, especially Brazil and Argentina, which have
much larger economies. 2 sv The signal would be that reforms
and removal of tariffs have as their reward membership in a
free trade association granting access to the vast North
American markets.28 8 In addition, acknowledging Chile's
economic reforms and its successful transition from a state-
run economy to a competitive, market-driven economy will
encourage other Latin American countries to continue their
own economic transitions.28 9
Adding Chile to NAFTA without changing the cultural
industries exemption will safeguard the perpetual existence
of this provision which is available only to Canada. The
United States should seize the opportunity created with the
Chilean alliance to argue for the renegotiation of the exemp-
tion. The fundamental goal of NAFTA is hemispheric free
trade and free trade is not established with special side
Trade, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations).
284. Kerry Luft, Chile on Hold for NAFTA Entry; Negotiations Stalled by
Mexico Crisis, U.S. '96 Election, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1995, at B2.
285. Ian Brodie, Aiming to Join the Trade Club, THE TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995.
In the past 10 years, Chile's economy has grown at an average of 6% a year and
is expected to sustain such growth until the year 2000. Id. In addition, unem-
ployment (under 6%) and inflation (8.9%) is low by South American standards.
Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Howard LaFranchi, Chile, the Slender Success Story, Hopes to Fatten on
U.S. Trade Ties, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 25, 1995. Chile has privatized
state industries and social security. Brodie, supra note 285. Adding Chile will
also send a signal welcoming economic partnership with other Latin American
countries. LaFranchi, supra. This signal would be especially important consid-
ering that most Latin American countries are experiencing unprecedented eco-
nomic growth. Id.
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deals. 290 As more countries join the union, it will become
more difficult for the provisions to be changed. If NAFTA
misses this opportunity at this early stage, it may become in-
creasingly difficult to correct the cultural industries exemp-
tion flaw in the future when more trade issues, demands and
countries are involved.
4. The Cultural Industries Exemption can Cause
Piracy
Piracy is often a consequence of a cultural industries ex-
emption. 29 1 The definition of piracy is the "unauthorized du-
plication and sale of another's creative work."292 When
American producers and distributors are unable to make
their films available in foreign markets, a black market is
created where pirating films flourishes.29 3 In time, the mar-
ket for pirated films expands,294 resulting in reduced profits
and fewer legitimate markets for American movies.295
a. Harm .to the American Film Industry
Trade barriers to American entertainment products have
not eliminated the demand for these products; instead, the
demand is satisfied by pirates.2 96 Piracy is one of the most
debilitating drains on the American film industry.297 The
Motion Picture Export Association of America estimates
worldwide losses of $2 billion each year due to piracy of some
sort.298 In addition, the countries where the piracy occurs
also injure themselves by allowing "an underground economy
immune from taxes and other regulatory controls" to pros-
per.299 These countries further damage themselves because
290. Kevin M. Jordan, Comment, Intellectual Property Under NAFTA: Is
Chile Up to the Challenge?, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 367, 379 (1995).
291. See Jan D'Alessandro, Note, A Trade-Based Response to Intellectual
Property Piracy: A Comprehensive Plan to Aid the Motion Picture Industry, 76
GEO. L.J. 417, 426 (1987).
292. Id.
293. Id. See also Harper, supra note 138, at 159.
294. D'Alessandro, supra note 291, at 426.
295. Harper, supra note 138, at 159.
296. Id. at 160.
297. D'Alessandro, supra note 291, at 426.
298. Harper, supra note 138, at 161. This includes "theft of film prints, un-
authorized duplication of videocassettes, illegal cable-TV tape and highjacked
satellite signals." Id.
299. D'Alessandro, supra note 291, at 425.
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they subject their own filmmakers to unfair competition from
these counterfeiters, as well as endure a tarnished national
reputation as a trading partner. °°
b. India as an Example
An example of a nation's cultural protectionism going
awry is India. °1 In India, the government imposes an oner-
ous tax of up to 50% on cinema tickets and censorship boards
slow the exhibition of American movies by up to nine
months.3 0 2 The result is that the censorship board is circum-
vented and India loses valuable tax dollars because pirated
copies of American movies partially satisfy the public's de-
mand for American movies. 3
c. Mexican Improvement
During the last few years Mexico's film piracy has de-
creased. 4 Mexican officials have raised penalties and set up
a central administrator for agencies battling piracy. 5 Mex-
ico has received praise for its anti-piracy efforts from the Mo-
tion Picture Export Association. 30 6 However, Carmen
Quintanilla Madero, director of Mexico's copyright office,30 7
warns that the blame for the film piracy problem in Mexico
does not belong solely to Mexico °.3 0  According to Quintanilla,
the slow distribution of U.S. films has encouraged the boot-
legging.309 Quintanilla asserts, "[people in Mexico will not
wait a year to see a movie."310
300. Id.
301. Harper, supra note 138, at 159.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Elisabeth Malkin, Turning the Cannon on Mexican Pirates: The Gov-
ernment Cracks Down - But Record Companies Want More, Bus. WK., Oct. 24,
1994, at 20. In 1994, Mexico held the dubious honor as the worst pirating video
offender in Latin America. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Trade Ministers' Conference Reinforces Commitment to Construct Hemi-
spheric Free-Trade Zone, CHRON. LATIN AM. ECON. AFF., July 6, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 2297474.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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d. The International Appeal of American Films
There are a number of reasons why American entertain-
ment products have an advantage over foreign competitors.
One is because English is arguably the world's second lan-
guage.3 11 It is much easier for producers of English-language
movies to distribute and reap higher profits from their films
since more territories are available for distribution. 12 U.S.
film making also takes advantage of the "large mass of crea-
tive talent, established distribution systems, and expensive
production budgets" established in the United States. 13 As a
result, U.S. films are able to create material that appeals to a
very wide audience.314 For example, in television program-
ming, many foreign television production companies empha-
size their news over their entertainment programming, caus-
ing them to fall behind in competition with American TV
entertainment programming.315 Also, the cost of purchasing
U.S. television programming is usually much cheaper for for-
eign television production companies than developing and
producing their own domestic TV programming. 31 In the
United Kingdom, domestic programs often cost over £500,00
while U.S. shows generally cost around £50,000.
31
1
V. PROPOSAL
The United States entertainment industry must realize
that it overwhelms the cultural heritage of Canada and many
other nations. The United States entertainment industry can
be sensitive to this anxiety and at the same time effectively
deal with the present system of cultural trade restrictions.
The Directors Guild of Canada stated that "keeping a greater
share of film distribution profits in Canada was essential if
311. Harper, supra note 138, at 160.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. "U.S. programmers are able to offer low prices because they have
such a large domestic market, and can recoup a majority of their costs through
sales to U.S. networks." Kessler, supra note 37, at 565. On the other hand,
European programs are usually limited to a small domestic audience because
most European filmmakers and television programmers do not create en-
tertainment that extends beyond their own country's borders. Id. Conse-
quently, the smaller audience generates less advertising revenues, forcing up
the price that the networks must pay for these programs. Id.
315. Harper, supra note 138, at 160.
316. Kessler, supra note 37, at 565, 595.
317. Id. at 595.
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Canada's film industry was to generate the cash flow to fi-
nance more and better productions."31 In 1993, most of the
$1.5 billion in annual film and video revenue flowed back to
Hollywood film companies.3 19 Canada's then-federal commu-
nications minister Flora MacDonald echoed this sentiment by
saying that "[a] stronger Canadian distribution sector is des-
perately needed to bring Canadian films to Canadian screens
[and] to participate in financing production of those films. 32 °
A. Invest in the Canadian Film Industry
One action that the American film industry can take is to
invest in the Canadian film industry. The Canadian trend
has been toward allowing foreign investment in its entertain-
ment sector. 321 Through the Investment Canada Act
("ICA")322 the government has the ability to establish suita-
ble criteria by which a potential investor will have to conform
to provide a "net benefit" to Canada. 23 This puts the govern-
ment in a political "win-win" position as it "is able to tell Ca-
nadian nationalists that it has exacted concessions for Can-
ada while telling the business community and potential
foreign investors that it has continued its practice of not
blocking acquisitions."324
By taking advantage of the ICA, the American film in-
dustry may find a partial solution to the protectionism stance
of the NAFTA exemption clause. Filmmakers who establish
a business in Canada will fall under the ICA class of "Ameri-
can" and will be entitled to the same treatment as Canadians
and therefore not subject to the cultural industries exemp-
tion.325 The ICA helps take the "pressure out of the system
for ad hoc government intervention and provides a frame-
318. Crane, supra note 39, at D1.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 313.
322. Id. at 320 n.205 (citing Investment Canada Act, ch. 20, 1985 S.C. 419
(Can.) [hereinafter ICA]). The ICA recognizes "that increased capital and tech-
nology would benefit Canada, the purpose of this Act is to encourage investment
in Canada by Canadians, and non-Canadians." Konigsberg, supra note 36, at
320 n.205 (quoting ICA, supra 2).
323. Koenigsberg, supra note 36, at 313.
324. Id. at 314.
325. Id. at 320 n.210.
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work [by which] the government [can] negotiate with an ac-
quirer in the Canadian public interest."
326
B. Co-Production
1. Benefits
Another possible solution is for U.S. filmmakers to enter
into co-production deals with Canadian entities. Co-produc-
tions enable filmmakers to "share risks, gain tax breaks, par-
ticipate in subsidies, avoid quotas, and establish long-term
relationships with foreign partners." 27 In addition, co-pro-
ductions are instrumental in furnishing alternatives to the
standard American formula film, stimulate independent film
making and expand cultural frontiers.32 8 Benefits of co-pro-
duction are felt by both countries. The U.S. film companies
will have Canadian origin, which is needed to avoid the cul-
tural industries exemption. Canadian filmmakers will have
at their disposal more money for production budgets, as well
as having a better chance of getting their film released in the
United States, which will result in greater revenues. 29 Opti-
mistically, co-productions may eventually lead to the aban-
donment of the cultural industries exemption, as Canada
captures a greater domestic film market share and increases
its entertainment industry profits.
2. Popularity of Foreign Films in the United States is
Increasing
Recently, American audiences have given foreign films a
warmer reception than they have in the past. Films such as
China's "Farewell My Concubine,"33° Mexico's "Like Water
For Chocolate,"331 Vietnam's "The Scent of Green Papaya,"33 2
and the Taiwanese/American "The Wedding Banquet"
333
326. Koenigsberg, supra note 36, at 314.
327. Harper, supra note 138, at 183.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 184.
330. Id. at 184 n.274 (citing FAREWELL MY CONCUBINE (Tomson Film Co.
Ltd., Hong Kong/Miramax Films 1991)).
331. Harper, supra note 138, at 184 n.273 (citing LIKE WATER FOR CHOCO-
LATE (Miramax Films 1993)).
332. Harper, supra note 138, at 184 n.275 (citing THE SCENT OF GREEN PA-
PAYA (Les Productions Lazennec, Paris/Gui Phong Film Studio, Ho Chi Minh
City/First Look Pictures, Vietnam, 1993)).
333. Harper, supra note 138, at 184 n.276 (citing THE WEDDING BANQUET
(Central Motion Pictures Corp, Samuel Goldwyn Co., 1993)).
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have all been successful at the American box office.334 If for-
eign films continue to gain U.S. market share (i.e., increase
revenue), their U.S. release will be seen as more lucrative
than ever. This opportunity for greater profit may foster a
move toward co-productions. American and foreign film-
makers stand to benefit from such relationships. Co-produc-
tion agreements will enable foreign filmmakers to have ac-
cess to their U.S. partners' film distribution systems and
greater reserves of money.335 In exchange, such a collabora-
tive attitude may encourage foreign nations to lower or elimi-
nate trade restrictions for U.S. film makers.336
3. American Efforts to Combat European Protectionism
can be Employed in Canada
In Europe, the U.S. entertainment industry is making ef-
forts to encourage the private sector to reject the European
protectionism approach.33 7 The American entertainment in-
dustry is offering to assist European film development at all
levels. 3 Industry representatives are training scriptwrit-
ers339 and technicians, 340 helping producers develop a better
process for choosing more commercially interesting scripts,
and setting up trans-European distribution and marketing
systems.3 4 1  Through helping in the development of a
stronger European domestic film industry, the Americans are
hoping to relieve nationalist pressures for cultural industries
exemptions.34 2
This same approach would work well in Canada for the
same reasons it is becoming effective in Europe. Canadians
are clamoring for an injection of foreign investment into their
film industry.34 3 In return for the economic investment and
goodwill training, it would not be unreasonable for the
United States to expect some concessions from Canada, lead-
334. Harper, supra note 138, at 184.
335. Grant, supra note 46, at 1361.
336. See Harper, supra note 138, at 184. For example, co-productions may
allow an American film producer to avoid European quotas if a certain number
on nationals are working on the film. Id. at 188 n.270.
337. Kessler, supra note 37, at 602-10.
338. Id. at 607
339. Id.
340. Grant, supra note 46, at 1361.
341. Kessler, supra note 37, at 607.
342. Id.
343. See discussion supra Part V.
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ing ultimately to the renegotiation of the NAFTA cultural in-
dustries exemption.
The U.S. film industry admits that a healthy competitor
would "stimulate U.S. innovations, inspire U.S. artists, and
enhance consumer interest and demand in general."3 4 4 No
one benefits if U.S. films have a global monopoly.3 45 Lack of
diversity and competitive motivation and innovation causes a
monopoly to undermine itself.3 46 Diverse cultural offerings
attract more interest and increase the number of
consumers.
3 47
VI. CONCLUSION
The cultural industries exemption in NAFTA harms both
Canada and the United States. Canada is harmed because
instead of fostering culture identity, the exemption sterilizes
it. The exemption has also not proved to be effective. The
U.S. share of Canadian movie revenues has increased since
the inception of NAFTA. New technology also undermines
the exemption. Canada should embrace the new technology
as a way to fortify its film industry. However, Canada's films
will have less of an international appeal if it continues its
practices of fostering cultural identity through its entertain-
ment industry.
The United States is harmed by the exemption because it
is at the mercy of the Canadian government. Through the
exemption the Canadian government can limit importation of
U.S. films into Canada. The entertainment industry is one of
the most important industries in America. The United States
fears that if the exemption is enforced, it may seriously dam-
age the U.S. film industry, especially since it is becoming a
precedent for other international treaties. The United States
emphatically asserts that the cultural industries exemption
is antithetical to the NAFTA spirit of free trade and national
treatment.
The NAFTA cultural industries exemption has not
helped Canada. NAFTA is an agreement dedicated to free
trade. Adding exemptions slowly erodes this commitment.
Nations, such as Canada, that are concerned about possible
344. Kessler, supra note 37, at 608.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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"Americanization" of their culture should encourage Ameri-
can investment in their film industry or co-productions with
the United States. This allows the U.S. and foreign nations'
entertainment industries to thrive. The byproduct will be a
more diverse cultural product and people will have the free-
dom to choose their entertainment.
Therese Anne Larrea*
* The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Profes-
sor June Carbone in the preparation of this comment. Special thanks are also
extended to her husband, Mark, for his tolerance and support.
1150 [Vol. 37
